Value-pluralism

In philosophy, value-pluralism is the idea that two or more moral values may be equally correct and fundamental, yet in conflict. In addition, value-pluralism postulates that in many cases, such incompatible values may be incommensurable, in the sense that there is no objective ordering of them in terms of importance. Value-pluralism is a theory in metaethics, rather than an ethical theoryor a set of values in itself. Oxford historian of ideas Isaiah Berlinis credited with the first substantial work on value-pluralism, bringing it to the attention of academia. Joseph Razhas done further work clarifying value-pluralism.

William Jamesanticipated their work in an essay on The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, which he first delivered as a lecture in 1891. He wrote that none "of the measures [of goodness] that have been actually proposed has, however, given general satisfaction. . . . The various ideals have no common character apart from the fact that they are ideals. No single abstract principle can be so used as to yield to the philosopher anything like a scientifically accurate and genuinely useful casuistic scale."

Value-pluralism is an alternative to both moral relativismand moral absolutism. An example of value-pluralism is the idea that the moral life of a nun is incompatible with that of a mother, yet there is no purely rational measure of which is preferable. Hence, moral decisions often require radical preferences with no rational calculus to determine which alternative is to be selected.

Value-pluralism differs from value-relativism in that pluralism accepts limits to differences, such as when vital human needs are violated. It differs from value-universalism because it rejects the notion that there is any one universally valid moral system.

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It uses material from the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value-pluralism Wikipedia article Value-pluralism.