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Trolley problemThe trolley problem is a thought experimentin ethics, first introduced by Philippa Foot, but also extensively analysed by Judith Jarvis Thomsonand, more recently, by Peter Unger. Similar problems have traditionally been addressed by criminal lawyersand are sometimes regulated in penal codes, especially in civil legal systems. A classical example of these problems got known as "the plank of Carneades", forged by Carneadesto attack Stoicmoral theories as inconsistent.
The trolley problemThe problem is this:
Almost everyone who hears this case agrees that it is permissible to flip the switch. Most feel that this action is not only permissible, but, morally speaking, is the better option (the other option being to do nothing) in this case. This is puzzling, because, in flipping the switch, you are not passively allowing the death of the one on the sidetrack, but actively causing her death. It looks like a case of killing, not just a case of letting die. And we don't generally make favorable moral judgments about those who kill others, even if their actions have good consequences as well. Of course, a simple utilitariancalculation will justify this course of action, but non-utilitarians also usually want to say that flipping the switch is acceptable. Related problemsThe initial trolley problem becomes interesting when it is compared to other moral dilemmas. The fat manOne such is that offered by J. J. Thomson:
Resistance to this course of action seems strong; most people who approved of sacrificing one to save five in the first case do not approve in the second sort of case. This has led to attempts to find a relevant moral distinction between the two cases. One clear distinction is that in the first case, one does not intend harm towards anyone - harming the one is just a side-effectof switching the trolley away from the five. However, in the second case, harming the one is an integral part of the plan to save the five. [1] So, some claim that the difference between the two cases is that in the second, you intend someone's death to save the five, and this is wrong, whereas in the first, you have no such intention. This solution is essentially an application of the doctrine of double effect, which says that you may take action which has bad side-effects, but deliberately intending harm (even for good causes) is wrong. While there may be justifiable cause to sacrifice the fat man to save the five, it is also possible that this will not save the five victims, in which case it would have been wrong to sacrifice an extra fat man in the first case. On the other hand, Thomson argues that an essential difference between the original trolley problem and this version with the fat man, is that in the first case, you merely deflect the harm, whereas in the second case, you have to do something to the fat man to save the five. Thomson says that in the first case, nobody has any more right than anyone else not to be run over, but in the second case, the fat man has a right not to be pushed in front of the trolley. Utilitarians, of course, deny this. But so do some non-utilitarians such as Peter Unger, who rejects that it can make a substantive moral difference whether you bring the harm to the one or whether you move the one into the path of the harm. The track that loops backThe claim that it is wrong to use the death of one to save five runs into a problem with "loop" variants like this:
The only difference between this case and the original trolley problem is that an extra piece of track has been added, which seems a trivial difference (especially since the trolley won't travel down it anyway). So intuition may suggest that the answer should be the same as the original trolley problem - one may flip the switch. However, in this case, the death of the one actually is part of the plan to save the five. The loop variant may not be fatal to the 'using a person as a means' argument. This has been suggested by M.Costa "another trip on the trolley", who points out that if we fail to act in this scenario we will effectively be allowing the five as a means to saving the one, as the five will slow the train down and prevent it from circling around and killing the one. As in either case some will become a means to saving others, then we are permitted to count the numbers. This approach requires that we downplay the moral difference between doing and allowing. The man in the yardUnger argues extensively against traditional non-utilitarian responses to trolley problems. This is one of his examples:
Responses to this are partly dependent on whether the reader has already encountered the standard trolley problem (since there is a desire to keep one's responses consistent), but Unger notes that people who have not encountered such problems before are quite likely to say that, in this case, the proposed action would be wrong. Unger therefore argues that different responses to these sorts of problems are based more on psychology than ethics - in this new case, he says, the only important difference is that the man in the yard does not seem particularly "involved". Unger claims that people therefore believe the man is not "fair game", but says that this involvedness cannot make a moral difference. Unger also considers cases which are far more complex than the original Trolley problem, involving more than just two possible courses of action. In one such case, it is possible to do nothing and let five die, or to do something which will (a) save the five and kill four, (b) save the five and kill three, (c) save the five and kill two, or (d) save the five and kill one. Most naive subjects presented with this sort of case, claims Unger, will choose (d), to save the five by killing one, even if this course of action involves doing something very similar to killing the fat man, as in Thomson's case, above. Footnotes
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Categories: Ethics| Thought experiments
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