[ICD 10 Search]

Back
[ICD 10 Search]

Moral luck

Moral luck is the phenomenon whereby a moral agentis assigned moral blame or moral praise for an action or its consequences even when it is clear that the agent in question did not have full control over either the action or its consequences. This term was introduced by Bernard Williams, and the question of moral luck ? including most notably its significance to a coherent moral theory ? has been initially developed by Williams and Thomas Nagelin their essays on the topic.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1 Responsibility and voluntarism
2 The problem of moral luck
3 Four types of moral luck
- 3.1 Resultant moral luck
- 3.2 Circumstantial moral luck
- 3.3 Constitutive moral luck
- 3.4 Causal moral luck
4 Two extremes
5 Alternatives
6 Conclusion
7 See also

Responsibility and voluntarism

Broadly speaking, we tend to correlate, at least intuitively, responsibility and voluntary action. We assign the most blame to persons for their actions and the consequences they entail when we have good cause to believe that 1) the action was performed voluntarily and without outside coercion, and 2) the agent understood the full range of the consequences of his decisions and actions, as could have reasonably been foreseen either at or prior to the time that the action was performed.

Conversely, we tend to be much more sympathetic to those who satisfy any of the following conditions: 1) the agent was coerced to perform the action; 2) the agent performed the action through accident and without any fault or negligence of his own; and 3) the agent did not know, and had no way of knowing, at the time, the consequences that his actions would bring.

The above seems at least intuitively true for assignation of moral blame. Parenthetically, the above criteria do not correlate exactly with moral praise ? while it may be true that we can, and should assign a good deal of moral praiseto those who had performed a good action, or an action entailing good consequences, completely on his own volition and uncoerced, it is debatable that the same distinction holds for involuntary actions that happened to turn out well or happened to produce good outcomes.

This correlation between responsibility and voluntary action is acceptable to most people on an intuitive level; indeed, this correlation is echoed in American and European law: for this reason, for example, manslaughter, or killing in self-defense carries a significantly different type of legal punishment (i.e., formalized moral blame) than premeditated murder.

The problem of moral luck

If we accept the notion of equating moral responsibility with voluntary action, however, moral luck becomes a problem. This problem is perhaps best illustrated by an example that many moral luck philosophers employ ? that of a traffic accident.

Suppose there are two truck drivers, Driver A, and Driver B. They are exactly alike in every single way, drive the same exact car, have the same driving schedule, have the same exact reaction time, and so forth. Let?s say that Driver A is driving down a road, following all legal driving requirements, when suddenly, a child runs out in the middle of the road to retrieve a lost ball. Driver A slams the brakes, swerves, in short, does everything to try to avoid hitting the child ? alas, the inertia of the truck is too great, and the distance between the truck and the child is too short. Unfortunately, the child is killed as the result of the collision. Driver B, in the meantime, is following the exact same route, doing all the exact same things, and everything is quite exactly the same ? except for one important distinction. In his scenario, there is no child that appears on the road as if out of nowhere. He gets to his destination safely, and there no accident occurs.

If a bystander were asked to morally evaluate Drivers A and B, there is very good reason to expect him to say that Driver A is due more moral blame than Driver B. After all, his course of action resulted in the death of a child, whereas the course of action taken by Driver B was quite uneventful. However, there are absolutely no differences in the controllable actions performed by Drivers A and B. The only disparity is that in the case of Driver A, an external uncontrollable event occurred, whereas it did not in the case of Driver B. The external uncontrollable event, of course, is the child appearing on the road. In other words, there is no difference at all in what the two of them could have done ? however, one seems clearly more to blame than the other. How does this occur?

This is the problem of moral luck. If we agree that moral responsibility should only be relevant when the agent voluntarily performed or failed to perform some action, we should blame Drivers A and B equally, or praise them equally, as may be the case. At the same time, this seems to be at least intuitively problematic, as ? whatever the external circumstances are ? one situation resulted in an unfortunate death, and the other did not.

Four types of moral luck

Thomas Nagel identified four different kinds of moral luck in his essay. The moral luck most relevant in the above example is resultant moral luck.

Resultant moral luck

Resultant moral luck has to do with consequences of actions and situations. In the above example, both drivers were affected by resultant moral luck in that a particular set of circumstances turned out in two different ways ? in one situation, a child appeared on the road, and in the other, did not.

Circumstantial moral luck

Circumstantial moral luckhas to do with the surroundings of the moral agent. The best-known example of circumstantial moral luck is one that Nagel provides in his essay. Consider Nazifollowers and supporters in Hitler'sGermany. They were (and are) certainly worth of moral blame for either committing morally reprehensible deeds or allowing them to occur without making efforts to oppose them. However, if in 1929, those people were, say, moved to Argentinaby their employers, it is quite possible that they would have led very different lives, and we could not assign the same amount of moral blame to them.

Constitutive moral luck

Constitutive moral luckconcerns the personal character of the moral agent. There can be little argument that our education, upbringing, genes, and other largely uncontrollable influences shape to some extent our personality; we can further say that our personality dictates, at least in some degree, our actions. We assign moral blame to an individual for being extremely selfish, for example, even though his selfishness is almost certainly due in part to external environmental effects. This is the phenomenon of constitutive moral luck.

Causal moral luck

Causal moral luckis an aspect of moral luck that Nagel details the least, and largely equates it with the problem of free will. The general definition of causal moral luck is that our actions are typically responses to external events, and are thus consequences of events that we do not ourselves control. Since we are restricted in our choice of actions by the events that precede them, we should not be morally responsible for such actions (or so the argument goes).

Nagel has been criticized for including causal moral luck as a separate category, since it appears to be largely redundant. It does not cover any cases that are not already included in constitutive and circumstantial luck, and seems to exist only for the purpose of bringing up the problem of free will.

Two extremes

Moral luck entails two extreme outcomes, both of which seem intuitively unacceptable.

If, one hand, we accept moral luck as a real phenomenon and accept it as a valid restriction on personal responsibility (and, consequently, the assignation of moral blame or praise), it is difficult to identify a situation where moral luck does not affect an event or an individual. Many, if not all, of the moral judgments that we engage in daily seem to become problematic, since any single action can be defended as having been affected by moral luck. Constitutive moral luck especially highlights this problem ? after all, it is perfectly valid to argue that every single thing that we do relates in some way to our personal character disposition, and is not one hundred percent voluntary. Thus, if we do stick by our requirement of moral responsibility as needing complete volition, we cannot validly morally assess any action performed by an individual. As Nagel himself points out, if moral luck is accepted as a valid premise, the area of individual moral responsibility seems to ?shrink?to an extensionless point.?

On the other hand, if we deny the influence of moral luck and refuse to accept that it has anything to do with moral evaluation (as Kant most certainly would, for example), we are left with a single unappealing option: we are responsible for everything that we do, whether voluntarily or not, and for all the consequences, no matter how unforeseen or unlikely, that our actions entail. By this logic, the unlucky Driver A from our earlier example can take no solace in the fact that there was nothing he could have done to prevent the death of the child as the result of the accident ? he deserves the full amount of moral blame that can be assigned for such an outcome.

Alternatives

Some philosophers, such as Susan Wolf, have tried to come up with ?happy mediums? that strike a balance between rejecting moral luck outright and accepting it wholesale. Wolf introduced the notions of rationalist and irrationalist positions as part of such a reconciliation.

The rationalist position, stated simply, is that equal fault deserves equal blame. Let us say that we have two drivers, both of whom failed to check their brakes before driving, and one of them runs over a pedestrian as a consequence while the other does not. The rationalist would say that since both of the drivers were equally at fault in failing to check their brakes, it should make no difference that one of them was lucky in not hitting a pedestrian while the other was unlucky ? moral fault is independent of consequence. Since the fault here is equal, the agents should respond equally.

The irrationalist position argues that equal fault need not deserve equal blame, as blame should depend on the consequences. By this logic, the lucky driver certainly does not deserve as much blame as the unlucky driver, even though their faults were identical.

Wolf combines these two approaches in trying to reconcile the tensions associated with moral luck by introducing the concept of a virtuous agent. A virtuous agent should accept that he has a special connection with the consequences of his actions, including equal-fault cases (such as the lucky / unlucky drivers above), and even in no-fault cases. This argument essentially retains the rationalist claim that equal fault is equally deserving of blame while also retaining the irrationalist claim that different outcomes should results in moral agents feeling and acting differently.

It is important to underline the distinction between internal and external moral blame or praise. Wolf believes that we, the outsiders, should blame the lucky and unlucky drivers equally despite our intuition that the two of them should not feel equally bad (i.e., the unlucky driver that ran over a pedestrian should feel worse); however, the unlucky driver himself should voluntarily accept the notion of the special connection between his actions and the unfortunate consequences, and assign more blame to himself than the lucky driver should.

Conclusion

The problem of moral luck is rather unsettling, as it seems to effectively undermine our ability to make correct and sound moral judgments. It appears that accepting or rejecting moral luck in toto fails to result in a moral theory that we find intuitively acceptable — although the failure of a moral theory to be intuitively acceptable does not automatically mean that it is deeply flawed. At the same time, it is difficult to establish a middle ground that successfully defends itself from the argument that we are responsible for nothing while retaining an acceptable notion of moral responsibility.